<div dir="ltr"><div><div style="font-size:13px">Dear all,</div><div style="font-size:13px"><br></div><div style="font-size:13px">In tomorrow's game theory reading group, <a href="http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/people/mb8">Dr Markus Brede</a> from AIC will give us a very interesting talk about the evolution of cooperation in structured populations. This talk will not only advance our knowledge about evolutionary game theory following Long's tutorial in April, but also covers a very rich introduction/discussion of Markus's recent work in this interesting field.</div><div style="font-size:13px"><br></div><div style="font-size:13px">Time/Venue: 13 August, 1:15pm - 2:00pm / B32 3073</div><div style="font-size:13px"><br></div><div style="font-size:13px">Online participation: <a href="http://goo.gl/bTKsje">http://goo.gl/bTKsje</a></div></div><div><br></div><div>Title:</div><div><span style="font-size:13px">The evolution of cooperation in structured populations</span><br style="font-size:13px"><br>Abstract:<br style="font-size:13px"><span style="font-size:13px">Starting with a brief introduction to evolutionary game theory, I will discuss some ideas that can explain how cooperative behaviour can evolve and persist in populations of interacting agents. A focus of the overview will be on structured populations and so-called "network reciprocity" and I will present some of my own work that highlights the importance of various types of heterogeneity for the evolution of cooperation. I'll conclude by discussing some recent directions and advances in the field.</span><br></div><div><br></div><div style="font-size:13px">To access all previous talks: <a href="https://sites.google.com/site/sotonecsreadinggroups/resources">https://sites.google.com/site/sotonecsreadinggroups/resources</a></div><div><br></div><div><div class="gmail_signature"><div dir="ltr"><div><div dir="ltr"><div><div dir="ltr"><div><div dir="ltr"><div><div dir="ltr"><div><div dir="ltr"><div>Best,</div><div>Dengji on behalf of the organisers</div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div>
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