<div dir="ltr">Dear all,<div><br></div><div>Sofia's talk is Today at 1:15pm in B32 3073. Thank you!</div><div><br></div><div>Best,</div><div>Dengji<br><div class="gmail_extra">
<br><div class="gmail_quote">On 1 June 2015 at 15:57, Dengji Zhao <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:d.zhao@soton.ac.uk" target="_blank">d.zhao@soton.ac.uk</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div style="font-size:13px"><div>Dear all,</div><div><br></div><div>In this Thursday's game theory reading group, Dr. Sofia Ceppi from Microsoft Research in Cambridge will give us a talk about the auction mechanism to use when the auctioneer wants to move from a GSP to a VCG auction and limits his loss in revenue.</div><div><br></div><div>Time/Venue: 4 June, 1:15pm - 2:00pm / B32 3073</div><div><br></div><div>Online participation: <a href="http://goo.gl/bTKsje" target="_blank">http://goo.gl/bTKsje</a></div><div><br></div><div>Title: </div><div>Auction Mechanism for Mixed Ads</div><div><br></div></div><div style="font-size:13px">Abstract:</div><div style="font-size:13px"><p class="MsoNormal">The sponsored search auction currently used by search engines to decide which ads to display and how much charge advertisers is a variation of the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction. Recent studies show that this type of auction is no longer suitable because of the rich space of ads types (e.g., images, rich media) and their combinations that are nowadays available. Truthful auctions are not affected by problems that make the GSP auction not appropriate anymore, and, thus, search engines should be motivated to use them. However, suddenly changing the auction used, moving from the GSP to a truthful one, can entail a significant loss in revenue for the search engine.</p><p class="MsoNormal">In the talk, I will describe a hybrid auction mechanism to use during the transition from the GSP auction to a truthful one that overcomes the problem of the loss in revenue of the search engine. With this mechanism bidders can be truthful or not and are accordingly treated differently. In particular, the class of hybrid mechanisms gives incentives for non-truthful bidders to bid truthfully, while behaving as a non-truthful auction if no bidder is truthful.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><br></p></div><div style="font-size:13px">To access all previous talks: <a href="https://sites.google.com/site/sotonecsreadinggroups/resources" target="_blank">https://sites.google.com/site/sotonecsreadinggroups/resources</a></div>
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