[Game Theory Reading] Re: Reading: (Thu 1:15pm) Auction Mechanism for Mixed Ads
Dengji Zhao
d.zhao at soton.ac.uk
Thu Jun 4 11:38:07 BST 2015
Dear all,
Sofia's talk is Today at 1:15pm in B32 3073. Thank you!
Best,
Dengji
On 1 June 2015 at 15:57, Dengji Zhao <d.zhao at soton.ac.uk> wrote:
> Dear all,
>
> In this Thursday's game theory reading group, Dr. Sofia Ceppi from
> Microsoft Research in Cambridge will give us a talk about the auction
> mechanism to use when the auctioneer wants to move from a GSP to a VCG
> auction and limits his loss in revenue.
>
> Time/Venue: 4 June, 1:15pm - 2:00pm / B32 3073
>
> Online participation: http://goo.gl/bTKsje
>
> Title:
> Auction Mechanism for Mixed Ads
>
> Abstract:
>
> The sponsored search auction currently used by search engines to decide
> which ads to display and how much charge advertisers is a variation of the
> Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction. Recent studies show that this type
> of auction is no longer suitable because of the rich space of ads types
> (e.g., images, rich media) and their combinations that are nowadays
> available. Truthful auctions are not affected by problems that make the GSP
> auction not appropriate anymore, and, thus, search engines should be
> motivated to use them. However, suddenly changing the auction used, moving
> from the GSP to a truthful one, can entail a significant loss in revenue
> for the search engine.
>
> In the talk, I will describe a hybrid auction mechanism to use during the
> transition from the GSP auction to a truthful one that overcomes the
> problem of the loss in revenue of the search engine. With this mechanism
> bidders can be truthful or not and are accordingly treated differently. In
> particular, the class of hybrid mechanisms gives incentives for
> non-truthful bidders to bid truthfully, while behaving as a non-truthful
> auction if no bidder is truthful.
>
>
> To access all previous talks:
> https://sites.google.com/site/sotonecsreadinggroups/resources
>
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